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PRESCRIBER INFORMATION AND PRIVACY: THE COSTS OF 
INNOVATION IN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY 
Marc A. McGrath 
A battle is being waged in multiple theatres across the U.S.; in court rooms, the media 
sphere, state governments and the Halls of Congress. As the march of technology accelerates and 
servers swell, teaming with the infinite data of every second, so too does society’s fear of the 
data and its implementation by various governmental and private actors. Rarely is the 
counterargument ever made, that this data is a valuable commodity to consumers and citizens; it 
often only felt but never expressed.  
The relationship between privacy and information is a tense one, calls for limitations on 
data-mining are growing in various unrelated fields. The information age has turned consumer 
data into a valuable commodity. Consumers receive numerous products for free in exchange for 
data. Companies like Google and Facebook utilize consumer data for advertising purposes. This 
commoditization is the same in the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. Data-mining is 
revolutionizing the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. Pharmaceutical companies are 
heavily investing in these practices to increase sales. Companies such as IMS Health, Inc., a 
major data-mining firm has made billions of dollars through its efficient use of data aggregation 
and mining. In response state governments have sought to limit data-mining through narrowly 
constructed statutes. In response to challenges the Supreme Court ruled against such laws in 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. In the wake of this decision, state legislatures and private industry are 
grappling with how best to proceed; states, still looking to limit data-mining and prescriber 
information with alternative avenues and private industry, how best to exploit and gain from the 
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Court’s decision. Both sides seem certain that their stated goals are paradoxical and mutually 
exclusive, but this isn’t necessarily true. 
This paper will demonstrate how industry, governments and consumers can all benefit 
from Data-mining and prescriber information collection. First, This paper will construct the 
necessary framework of information by exploring the industry and practices of pharmaceutical 
companies, data-mining firms and state governments. Next, this paper will briefly sketch both 
sides of the argument. Then, this paper will use this context to explore the legislative reaction to 
data-mining practices and the subsequent court challenges. Then this paper will explore the 
privacy concerns and implications of prescriber information and prescription data, demonstrating 
that such concerns are legitimate and that a protective regulatory framework is necessary, but 
that completely limiting data-mining practices does more harm than good. After, this paper will 
analyze the post-Sorrell framework created by the Supreme Court’s decision. Finally, this paper 
will use this context to demonstrate the industrial, societal and governmental benefits of 
prescriber information data-mining using specific examples and offering policy considerations 
and solutions that could alleviate concerns and augment the benefit of data-mining practices for 
all parties involved. 
Data-mining accompanied by smart policy and a strong legal framework will provide 
countless benefits for all parties involved. If we look past the immediate privacy concerns and 
consider the innovative ways that this data can be implemented, it will be clear that we have no 
need to fear data-mining and implementation. 
I. Industry Overview: Doctors, Data and Detailing. 
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The process of data aggregation, mining and detailing involves four major industrial 
players: The prescribing physician; the pharmacy; the data-mining firm; and the pharmaceutical 
company. The transfer of data and transaction of money facilitate the engine of this innovative 
industry. The process has yielded high returns for pharmaceutical companies and data-mining 
firms. 
Pharmaceuticals and “Big Data,” are big business. Pharmaceutical sales generate billions 
of dollars in revenue each year.
1
 Data-aggregating firms such as IMS Health derive a substantial 
amount of revenue from the sales of mined and aggregated prescriber information to these 
massive pharmaceutical corporations.
2
 Pharmaceutical companies are increasing their 
investments in marketing.
34
 
The pharmaceutical industry’s investment in marketing, data-mining and detailing is met by 
a steady demand of consumers. In the United States alone, Doctors prescribe nearly 4 billion 
prescriptions, averaging about four prescriptions per person.
5
  The quantity of prescriptions make 
it evident that pharmaceutical marketing and, in part, detailing has a tremendous effect on 
prescribers and consumers. 
                                                          
1
 Johnson & Johnson, a large pharmaceutical company has an EBITDA (Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortizations – essentially cashflow), Johnson & Johnson 3rd Quarter Earnings Report 
2012. Available at, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/JNJ/2137350681x0x604195/de164f41-f424-
4e8a-bfd2-3c5c369909db/CCSEQ312.pdf.  Pfizer, another large pharmaceutical company has an 
EBITDA of $5.7 Billion. Pfizer 3
rd
 Quarter 2012 Report. Available at, 
http://www.pfizer.com/files/investors/presentations/q3performance_110112.pdf.  
2
 Sales to the pharmaceutical industry accounted for “substantially all” of IMS’s revenue from 2003-2005. 
Marcia M. Boumil, et al, PRESCRIPTION DATA MINING, MEDICAL PRIVACY AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT: THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN SORRELL V. IMS HEALTH INC., 70 21 Annals 
Health L. 458 
3
 Which includes data-mining and detailing 
4
 Pharmaceutical companies spend about $6.3 billion dollars annually on marketing brand drugs to 
Prescribers. See, Natasha Singer, A Fight Over How Drugs Are Pitched, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 2011, at 
B1, available at http:// www.nytimes.com/2011/04/25/business/25privacy.html?Pagewanted=all. 
5
 Janet Lundy, Prescription Drug Trends, Henry J. Kaiser Family Found. 1, 3 (May 2010), 
http://www.kff.org/rxdrugs/upload/3057-08.pdf 
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The data-mining process beings with the physician. The physician’s role in the data-mining 
and detailing process is both passive and necessary to the large construct. The physician writes a 
prescription to treat the specific issue that the patient has. The physician also ends the detailing 
cycle as an audience to the pharmaceutical representative. The patient brings this information to 
a retail pharmacy. The pharmacy is the first major point of information exchange. 
Patients at a pharmacy rarely have a complete picture of what information is being provided 
to the retail pharmacy.  When a patient receives medication, he or she also provides very specific 
information, both implicit and explicit. Pharmacy’s collect the data for each prescription and 
store the information.  This information, in an aggregated form is extremely valuable to data 
mining companies and pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 The next step in the process is the purchase and aggregation of prescriber information. 
Health information organizations (data-mining companies and data vendors) purchase the 
information from retail pharmacies.
6
 The information purchased contains such specifics as: 
name, dosage, and quantity of the drug prescribed; the data and place the prescription was filled; 
and the patients’ age and sex.7 The patient’s actual name is encrypted,8 but every patient is given 
a unique identification number, thereby allowing health information organizations to link 
prescriptions and physicians to individual patients and track prescription patterns over time.
9
 
                                                          
6
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., Prescription Data Mining, Medical Privacy and the First Amendment: The 
U.S. Supreme Court in Sorrell v. Ims Health Inc., 21 Annals Health L. 447, 450 (2012) 
7
 Id. 
8
 See, http://www.cutbit.com/cutbit/how-encryption-works-in-your-web-browser-video_75e66a641.html 
to get a better sense of the mechanics of encryption. 
9
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 450 (2012). 
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This information is then used in conjunction with The American Medical Association’s (AMA) 
“Physican Masterfile”10 to match data and render individualized prescriber profiles.11 
 Health information companies then aggregate the information and identify specific 
patterns and trends, both generally and for specific prescribers.
12
  Thus the raw material of 
information has been narrowed and refined into a very valuable finished product. Health 
information companies then sell or lease this information product to pharmaceutical companies, 
whose representatives use it to develop, monitor, and/or adapt their targeted marketing strategies 
to boost drug sales.
13
 The implementation of this information is don’t by a process called 
“Detailing.” 
Detailing typically consists of pharmaceutical company representatives meeting face-to-face 
with physicians in an attempt to augment the physician’s prescriptive behavior.14 The Maine 
legislature defined “detailing” as, “one-to-one contact with a prescriber or employees or agents 
of a prescriber for the purpose of increasing or reinforcing prescribing of a certain drug by the 
prescriber.”15 The process of detailing is time-consuming for both physicians and pharmaceutical 
representatives, so most detailing interactions are used to market pharmaceuticals that generate 
the most profit.
16
 The pharmaceutical industry employees over 90,000 sales representatives, who 
make weekly or monthly trips to physicians’ offices on an annual basis to facilitate this 
                                                          
10
 A complete list of 1.4 million physicians, residents, and medical students in the U.S. See, 
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/about-ama/physician-data-resources/physician-masterfile.page. 
11
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 450 (2012). 
12
 Although prescriber information is generally the information collected and analyzed by health 
information companies, such companies will also purchase information from insurance companies and 
other carriers to acquire raw information and data. DePaul J. 344. 
13
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 450 (2012). 
14
 Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 22, § 1711-E 
15
 IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 46 (1st Cir. 2008). 
16
 IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 14 (1st Cir. 2010). 
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process.
17
 Physicians will meet with twenty-eight or more detailers every week while specialists 
meet with fourteen per week.
18
  To sweeten the meeting, detailers often bring free samples,
19
 
complimentary gifts and promotional information for the physician.
20
 Each meeting is vital to the 
pharmaceutical industry and implicitly the health information companies as well. 
The amount of detailing meetings that physician’s participate in is evident that such meetings 
serve a certain purpose to the medical community. Detailing allows for a quick, effective 
informational presentation
21
 so that physicians can keep up to date on the latest advancements of 
the pharmaceutical industry.  Thus, these meetings can be read to be tacitly beneficial to 
consumers and patients as well as physicians and the pharmaceutical companies, although such 
benefits are countered by claims of bias-forming, asymmetrical and limited information which 
some claim are a detriment to the healthcare industry as well as governments and patient-
consumers. 
Consumer groups, physicians’ organizations and state governments have voiced increasing 
concern at the proliferation of data by private industry and the effects of detailing on physicians’ 
prescriptive behavior. Critics of data-mining and detailing have claimed that such processes 
broach privacy rights of consumers and physicians, and that detailing creates prescriptive 
behavior biases toward brand-name drugs, instigates a compulsion to reciprocate because of gifts 
and presentations and  drives up healthcare costs through over-prescription of high-cost name 
brand pharmaceuticals.
22
 These concerns led to the implementation of state laws restricting the 
                                                          
17
 Id. 
18
 Id. 
19
 Nearly $1 billion worth annually. Id. At 8 
20
 Id. 
21
 Although lacking some objectivity. 
22
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 451(2012). 
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practice of data-mining for detailing purposes and eventually the seminal Supreme Court case, 
Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. which found these processes constitutionally protected. 
II. The March Toward Sorrell: State Legislatures and the Supreme Court Examine 
the Practice of Data-Mining and Detailing. 
An arms race between private industry and state governments began in an attempt to 
expand and restrict data-mining and detailing respectively. The proliferation and increasing 
sophistication of data-mining was met by a swath of state legislature attempts at curbing the 
collection and implementation of data-mining and detailing. Between 2006 and 2007, twenty-six 
states had either legislated or begun the process to restrict the collection and implementation of 
prescriber information in the pharmaceutical industry.
23
 Combating these legislative efforts were 
health information organizations, the assertion of first amendment protections and claims that 
those protections were violated by the newly written statutes. This section will examine the 
policy considerations and the implications of three statutes that attempted to limit data mining 
practices. Next, this section will examine the three subsequent challenges to states’ legislation. 
Finally this section will detail the Supreme Court challenge to limits on data mining in Sorrell v. 
IMS as well examine the fallout. 
A. State Legislature Attempts at Limiting the Health Information and Pharmaceuticals 
Industry. 
In direct response to the burgeoning industry of data mining, states began to create 
legislation to limit the data mining of prescriber information. In New Hampshire, Maine and 
Vermont, state legislatures sought to limit the use an implementation of prescriber information 
                                                          
23
 Id. at 454. 
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using similar procedural mechanisms.  Each state advanced three similar goals in legislating 
against the practice of data-mining and detailing: protection of public health, maintenance of 
physician privacy, and containment of rising health care costs.
24
 The theory behind these 
legislative efforts is that a ban on the commercial use of prescriber information would curb this 
‘detrimental’ industry.25 More specifically, protection of public health would benefit by focusing 
physicians' decision-making on medical and scientific knowledge and by reducing the number of 
new drugs without well-documented track records being prescribed with the attendant risk of 
potentially dangerous health effects.
26
 Cost controls would be affected by limiting the effect of 
persuasive detailing on physicians, that are argued to lead to the over-prescription of expensive 
brand drugs.
27
  Although these legislative efforts would have the effect of curbing the use of 
prescriber information in a commercial context, none sought to ban such data collection outright, 
rather these statutes were drafted to restrict commercial use only but allow for other ‘non-
commercial’ uses.28 Rather, the statutes would regulate the dissemination of prescriptive 
information data at its source by preventing pharmacies and other entities from engaging in 
specific commercial transactions without prescriber permission.
29
 
The three laws utilize different mechanisms to achieve their goals and policies. The New 
Hampshire law (the most stringent of the three), imposed an absolute ban on utilizing all 
“records relative to prescription information containing patient-identifiable and prescriber 
                                                          
24
 Id. At 453. See, Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 4631(a) (2009); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 22, § 1711-E(1-B) 
(2008). 
25
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 453 (2012). 
26
 Id.at 453. 
27
 Id. 
28
 Id. 
29
 Id. 
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identifiable data.”30 Thus, prescriber data could only be used in limited circumstances for 
“limited purposes of pharmacy reimbursement; formulary compliance; care management; 
utilization review by a health care provider, the patient's insurance provider or the agent of 
either; health care research; or as otherwise provided by law.”31 New Hampshire’s legislation 
banned the use of prescriber data for, “Commercial purpose [which] includes, but is not limited 
to, advertising, marketing, promotion, or any activity that could be used to influence sales or 
market share of a pharmaceutical product, influence or evaluate the prescribing behavior of an 
individual health care professional, or evaluate the effectiveness of a professional pharmaceutical 
detailing sales force.”32 The New Hampshire law had the effect of allowing prescriber data to be 
used for most anything aside from detailing. Unlike the Maine and Vermont statutes, the New 
Hampshire statute does not give health care providers the option to either opt in or opt out of the 
commercial use of their Prescriber information data.
33
 
The Maine statute is less restrictive than the statute drafted by New Hampshire, but still has 
the effect of limiting the use of prescriber information for commercial purposes. Maine statute is 
structured to limit the use of PI data for direct marketing to physicians and other prescribers. 
34
 
The major difference between New Hampshire’s complete and total ban of prescriptive 
information in commercial practices and Maine’s statute is that Maine only limits “prescription 
drug information that identifies a prescriber who has filed for confidentiality protection.”35 
Therefore, Main’s legislature created an ‘opt-out’ mechanism that allows for physicians to 
shroud their prescriptive behavior by filing for confidentiality protection. Until a prescriber 
                                                          
30
 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318:47-f 
31
 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318:47-f 
32
 N.H. Rev. Stat. § 318:47-f 
33
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 456 (2012). 
34
 Id. at 455. 
35
 22 M.R.S.A.  § 1711-E(2-A). 
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affirmatively indicates a desire to protect his or her identifiable information, the law does not 
affect the normal course of business between entities receiving prescriber information data, such 
as pharmacies, and the pharmaceutical manufacturers that purchase the data to inform marketing 
activities.
36
 
The Vermont law, like the Maine law rests on an option mechanism, allowing for prescribers 
to choose to allow their data to be used for commercial practices. But where the Maine statute 
utilizes an ‘opt-out’ mechanism, the Vermont legislature implemented an ‘opt-in’ consent 
scheme.
37
 Absent a physician’s consent, prescriber-identifying information may not be sold by 
pharmacies and similar entities, disclosed by those entities for marketing purposes, or used for 
marketing by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
38
 This prohibition is subject to exceptions for 
prescriber-identifying information to be disseminated and used for a number of purposes, 
including “pharmacy reimbursement; prescription drug formulary compliance; patient care 
management; utilization review by a health care professional, the patient's health insurer, or the 
agent of either; or health care research”39 as well other law enforcement40, regulatory41 and 
research,
42
  as well as a number of other reasons. While the law appears to create a few narrow 
exceptions to a blanket ban on prescriber information collect, the effect of the Vermont law, as 
well as those of New Hampshire and Maine was to limit the narrow practice of data collection of 
prescriber information for commercial practices. 
                                                          
36
 22 M.R.S.A.  § 1711-E. 
37
 18 V.S.A. § 4631. 
38
 Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2656 (2011). See also, Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 18, § 4631(d). 
39
 18 V.S.A. § 4631(e)(1). 
40
 Id. at (e)(6). 
41
 Id. at (e)(5). 
42
 Id. at (e)(4). 
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 The statutes of New Hampshire, Maine and Vermont all sought to limit commercial use 
of prescriber information to meet the policy goal of protecting of public health, maintaining 
physician privacy, and containing rising health care costs. Shortly after the implementation of 
these statutes, IMS Health and other health information services challenged the constitutionality 
of these laws on First Amendment grounds. 
B. Legal Challenges to State Prescriber Information Laws: Ayotte, Mills, and Sorrell 
As quickly as legislation was enacted to limit the pervasive use of prescriber data in 
commercial practices, so to were challenges to these laws brought in the judicial system. IMS 
lead the challenges in all three states.
43
 Verispan, LLC, a small health information vendor, joined 
IMS Health’s challenge to the New Hampshire Law.44 Pharmaceutical Research and 
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) also brought action against Vermont’s statute and was 
merged with IMS Health’s suit.45  
The statutes represented a direct threat to vital revenue streams for IMS Health, Verispan, 
LLC and other companies who derived revenue from data-mining and aggregation. In 2006, 
when New Hampshire passed its law, IMS Health's revenues totaled $1.96 billion, a twelve-
percent increase from the previous year, a large portion of this revenue was from the sale of 
prescriber data.
46
 IMS Health's biggest clients are pharmaceutical companies, whose use of PI 
                                                          
43
 IMS Health, Inc.  v. Ayotte; IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills; IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell. 
44
 IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010). 
45
 IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell, 631 F. Supp. 2d 434, 444 (D. Vt. 2009). 
46
 Marcia M. Boumil et. al., 21 Annals Health L. at 458 (2012). 
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data would have been curtailed to varying degrees under each statute.
47
 In fact, sales to the 
pharmaceutical industry accounted for “substantially all” of IMS's revenue from 2003-2005.48 
The first challenge to a state statute occurred in IMS Health, Inc. v. Ayotte. In Ayotte  the 
first circuit court of appeals held that New Hampshire’s law limiting Data-Mining and Detailing 
for commercial reasons was permissible as regulation of conduct and not speech.
49
 The court 
found New Hampshire’s reasoning and methodology was precise and reasonable in trying to 
limit a, “novel threat to the cost-effective delivery of health care.”50 
 Two years after the First Circuit upheld New Hampshire’s statute, the first circuit 
affirmed their reading of prescriber information laws in IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills. The first 
circuit stood its ground in finding that Maine’s prescriber data law was limiting only conduct and 
not speech.
51
 The court also addressed any potential commercial speech concerns, by applying 
the Central Hudson Test.
52
 The court found that the statute met the Central Hudson Test and was 
therefore permissible.
53
 The court found that Maine’s opt-out provision for physicians was 
similar to a “do not call” option for citizens.54  
                                                          
47
 Id. 
48
 Id., (quoting IMS's 2005 Annual Report). 
49
 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 45. 
50
 Id. 
51
 Mills, 616 F.3d at 12-13. 
52
 Id.. The Central Hudson Test is a four-part analysis to determine whether a restriction on commercial 
speech violates the first amendment. The analysis first determines whether the expression is protected by 
the first amendment, it must be lawful and not misleading. Next, the court looks to whether government 
interest is substantial. Then, the court looks should determine  whether the regulation directly advances  
the government interest asserted. Finally, the court looks to whether the regulation is more expansive than 
is necessary to serve the interest. See CENTRAL HUDSON GAS & ELEC. v. PUBLIC SERV. 
COMM'N, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
53
 Mills, 616 F.3d at 12-13. 
54
 Id. at 21-22. 
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The last challenge occurred in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in response to Vermont’s 
legislation banning the use of prescriber information for commercial purposes. After failing to 
void the laws in the First Circuit, IMS Health Inc. and other similarly situated parties
55
 sought to 
target Vermont’s law in the Second Circuit.  The Second Circuit Court of Appeals holding in 
IMS Health, Inc. v. Sorrell initiated the circuit split and ultimately answered in the affirmative 
the constitutional protections for data-mining and prescriber information in a commercial 
context. 
 IMS Health, Inc. and their constituents challenged Vermont’s statute which banned the 
sale, transmission, or use of prescriber-identifiable data for marketing or promoting a 
prescription drug without consent.
56
 The appellants claimed that the Vermont law: (1) restricted 
non-commercial speech and could not withstand strict scrutiny, (2) cannot withstand 
intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson, and (3) the law violated the dormant Commerce 
Clause by prohibiting commerce wholly outside of Vermont.
57
 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals held that Vermont’s statute, “does not directly advance the substantial state interests 
asserted by Vermont, and is not narrowly tailored to serve those interests, the statute cannot 
survive intermediate scrutiny under Central Hudson” and subsequently overruled the lower court, 
holding the statute unconstitutional.
58
 
 The difference in analysis between the First and Second Circuits stemmed from the 
differing interpreting methods. The First Circuit read New Hampshire and Maine’s statute as 
                                                          
55
 Verispan, LLC, Source Healthcare Analytics, Inc., a subsidiary of Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc., and 
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America. See, IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263 
(2d Cir. 2010) cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 857, 178 L. Ed. 2d 623 (U.S. 2011) and aff'd, 131 S. Ct. 2653, 180 
L. Ed. 2d 544 (U.S. 2011). 
56
 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 266 (2d Cir. 2010). 
57
Id. 
58
Id. at 267. 
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regulating, “conduct because those provisions serve only to restrict the ability of data miners to 
aggregate, compile, and transfer information destined for narrowly defined commercial ends” 
rather than speech.
59
 The Second Circuit, in contravention of the first found that Vermont’s 
statute was a limitation on speech and therefore unconstitutional.
60
 The Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals was critical of their sister-circuit’s reasoning, writing that the First Circuit had 
exercised, “freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the 
First Amendment.”61 With such a disparate reading of similar statutes, the Supreme Court found 
it necessary to rule on the issue.
62
 
 
C. The Supreme Court Defends Data-Mining as Speech in Sorrell  
The Supreme Court heard both sides of the argument in the lead up to their decision. A 
great number of amicus curie briefs were filed for both state legislative actions as well as for the 
pharmaceutical and health information services industries. Much of the arguments from both 
groups were focused on constitutionality and first amendment grounds.
63
  At issue was 
Vermont’s Act 80 and whether the restrictions and narrow exceptions present in the language in 
the statute unconstitutionally limited free speech.
64
 The Court ultimately determined that 
Vermont’s law “on its face, Vermont’s law enacts content-and speaker-based restrictions on the 
sale, disclosure, and use of prescriber-identifying information”65 because “The provision first 
                                                          
59
 Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 53. 
60
 IMS Health Inc. v. Sorrell, 630 F.3d 263, 267 (2d Cir. 2010). 
61
 Id. at 272. 
62
 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S. Ct. 857 (2011). 
63
 See generally, Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., amicus curiae briefs. 
64
 Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 131 S.Ct. 2653, 2661 (2011). 
65
  Sorrell v. IMS Health, 131 S.Ct. at 2662. 
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forbids sale subject to exceptions based in large part on the content of a purchaser’s speech,”66 
and , “the provision’s second sentence prohibits pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the 
information for marketing. The statute thus disfavors marketing, that is, speech with a particular 
content. More than that, the statute disfavors specific speakers, namely pharmaceutical 
manufacturers.”67 The Court ultimately concluded that, “§ 4631(d) leaves detailers no means of 
purchasing, acquiring, or using prescriber-identifying information. The law on its face burdens 
disfavored speech by disfavored speakers.”68 
The Court began its analysis by looking at the record and the formal legislative findings.
69
 
The Court noted that “the law’s express purpose and practical effect are to diminish the 
effectiveness of marketing by manufacturers of brand-name drugs.”70 Because the law was 
written to regulate both content and speaker, The Court found that, “heightened judicial scrutiny 
is warranted.”71 
Strict scrutiny is applied when, “regulations reflecting “aversion” to what “disfavored 
speakers” have to say.”72 This heightened level of scrutiny requires that the statute support a 
compelling government interest; the law is narrowly tailored; and the statute employs the least 
restrictive means for achieving the stated government goal.
73
 Vermont argued that the statute 
advanced import public policy, namely that the law would lower the cost of medication for 
                                                          
66
 Id. 
67
 Id. 
 
69
 Id. At 2663. 
70
 Id. 
71
 Id. At 2664. 
72
 Sorrell v. IMS  131 S.Ct. at 2264, Quoting, Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
658 (1994). 
73
 Id. 
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consumers and promoting public health.
74
 The Court found this argument unpersuasive, stating, 
“The State seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of restraining certain 
speech by certain speakers—that is, by diminishing detailers’ ability to influence prescription 
decisions. Those who seek to censor or burden free expression often assert that disfavored 
speech has adverse effects.”75 Thus, Vermont’s legislation was found to be unconstitutional and 
void.
76
 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell, industry, academia and states have 
begun to address the limitations on legal restraints and policy going forward. The Sorrell 
decision has set an importance precedent for the healthcare and pharmaceutical industries as well 
as consumers and government. 
III. Prescription Data and Privacy Concerns  
The stakes are high, individual privacy is quickly being eroded by the rising tide of 
information technology. Our online habits, search and web history, and social activities are being 
quantified and tracked. This information is being utilized for many positive uses as this paper 
will demonstrate, but this information is also utilized in processes that compromise privacy and 
raises concern. This section will discuss some of these privacy issues and concerns and explore 
how the processes of data-mining and detailing complicate personal privacy for both patients and 
doctors. Further this section will use real life instances on the detrimental effects of prescription 
information privacy infringement. Threats to privacy will only become a greater concern as 
information technology and data analysis advances into other fields. The best way to combat 
                                                          
74
 Id. at 2670. 
75
 Id. 
76
 Id. at 2672. 
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such threat is to not legislate or regulate away the technology and usage, but rather to craft 
legislation that protects privacy without stunting the growth of this vital technology. 
Patient health information privacy is largely directed and protected by HIPAA
77
 and (as 
amended by) HITECH.
78
  In tandem, these legislative and regulatory efforts require that 
healthcare information be de-identified before it is used for marketing purposes.
79
   Doctors, 
pharmacies and even health information companies
80
 are covered entities under HIPAA
81
. Under 
this regime, a covered-entity can claim that information is de-identified only if an individual with 
appropriate knowledge and experience with generally accepted statistical and scientific 
principles and methods for rendering information not individually identifiable; or the name,
82
 
any and all geographic subdivisions smaller than a State,
83
  dates, telephone numbers, e-mail 
addresses, social security numbers, and nearly all other identifying forms.84  A covered entity can 
assign a unique identification number to the record.
85
  These statutory and regulatory protections 
are seemingly very protective of patient privacy. Critics of Vermont’s pre-Sorrell legislation 
have commented that such protections are more than enough to protect patient privacy interests 
and that the legislation was redundant.
86
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Some critics have suggested that patient privacy concerns can be implicated via re-
identification of prescription data and that HIPAA privacy standards are out of date.
87
 Although 
prescriber data is anonymized by retailers prior to being sold to data-mining firms, some fear that 
this information can be analyzed to re-identify patient identity thus yielding information that 
could be used to the detriment of that patient.
88
 Proponents of data-mining practices have 
claimed that patient identification and information cannot be re-identifed.
89
 of The Supreme 
Court in Sorrell largely avoided issues of patient privacy, and only addressed privacy in regards 
to physician privacy.
90
 El Emam and Yakowitz  argue in there Sorrell Amici Brief that HIPAA 
and HITECH standards of privacy are more than enough to protect against privacy 
infringement,
91
 but  others have argued that these standards are no longer relevant because of the 
advances in information technology.
92
 Sweeney was able to demonstrate the threat of re-
identification by matching demographics in de-identified medical data to a population register to 
affix patient names to records in the data.
93
 This work was directly cited in HIPAA legislation.
94
 
Sweeney and others are concerned that with the increase in amount of information
95
 and 
increased capabilities of data-processing that even more information is prone to re-
identification.
96
 The debate over privacy protections for patients is contentious, some claim that 
the current legal regime is more than enough to protect against re-identification and that using 
this issue as a justification to limit prescriber information and detailing does not logically follow, 
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while others call for further protections for patient privacy that would further limits uses and the 
identifying features of prescriber data. 
 Much of this debate has existed in the abstract, instances of individuals suffering an 
injury from the use of prescriber information are not seemingly common or recorded, although 
not unheard of. The case of Walter and Paula Shelton demonstrates the dark side of widely 
available and accessible prescriber information. The Sheltons were rejected by a health insurance 
provider after a company representative pulled their drug profiles and questioned them over the 
telephone about prescriptions from Wal-Mart Stores and Randalls, part of the Safeway grocery 
chain, for blood-pressure and anti-depressant medications.
97
 The Sheltons claim that the 
medication was prescribed for off-label uses such as swelling and sleep assistance, but 
representatives of the health insurance company still denied their application because depression 
and mental health issues are a red flag for health insurance companies.
98
 Under the current 
regulatory regime, such identifying information should not be readily available to health 
insurance companies and other purchases. While it is unclear exactly how the Sheltons’ 
prescription history was identified, it is clear such identifying information is dangerous and can 
have negative implications on consumers and those who near healthcare the most. 
 Any regulation of information and especially prescription data must be secured and 
unidentifiable. The implications of weak regulation are costly and potentially life threatening. 
These privacy concerns are addressed by federal regulation, but the strength and effectiveness of 
these regulations are controversial. Although such data can be used for nefarious reasons, or in 
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practices that induce harm to individuals, this is not by itself to ‘throw out the baby with the 
bathwater.’ Regulation of prescriber data should prevent re-identification, but should not hamper 
or limit this innovative aspect of healthcare. 
IV. Data-Mining and Legislation in the Wake of Sorrell 
The Sorrell decision marked an important evolution in the healthcare and pharmaceutical 
industry as well as the legal regime that traditionally govern industry. This section will address 
the possible legal, societal and industry implications of the Supreme Court’s decision. The 
Sorrell decision has broadened the abilities and uses of data-mining and detailing, but also 
provides government with a clear roadmap to for legislating data-mining and detailing. Further, 
alternative forms of regulation are available to both state and federal governments. 
The legislative implications are clear, state governments that wish to limit the use of 
prescriber information and detailing will need to enact stringent laws with few exceptions. First a 
state writing would need to comport with the Supreme Court’s critical analysis and the Central 
Hudson Test. A clear state interest in privacy would need to be advanced by the law.
99
 The 
Supreme Court stated, “The state might have advanced its asserted privacy interest by allowing 
the information’s sale or disclosure in only a few narrow and well-justified circumstances.”100  
The Maine, New Hampshire and Vermont Statutes all, implicitly or explicitly targeted data-
mining used for marketing purposes, but carved out generous exceptions for non-market 
purposes such as research, law enforcement, and other public policy goals.
101
 Therefore, any 
subsequent laws passed after Sorrell would needed to be largely restrictive to most uses of the 
information aggregated and shaped by health information companies like IMS Health, Inc. Such 
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restrictive legislation will likely be met by a skeptical court. While such restrictive laws would 
resolve privacy concerns and provide strong protections against data-mining, they would also 
curtail the societal, industrial and governmental benefits offered by such data-mining practices. 
State governments may (and should) be hesitant to draft such restrictive legislation. 
The implications for the pharmaceutical industry are good for business and a concern for 
policy makers. In the wake of Sorrell, there is a growing concern that off-label prescription use 
will become more prevalent due to the Supreme Court’s reading of prescriber information laws. 
Off-label promotion is the act of marketing or promoting pharmaceutical drugs or treatments for 
uses other than those that the FDA had approved them for.
102
 Commentators have noted that the 
Sorrell ruling, “provides strong support for challenging FDA’s efforts to regulate what the 
government calls the off-label promotion of drugs for medical uses that are not approved by the 
FDA.”103 Read broadly, the Court’s decision in restricts legislatures from impeding upon 
pharmaceutical companies and physicians from communicating truthful information and 
prescriptions regarding FDA approved pharmaceutical products.
104
 Current FDA regulation 
criminalizes  pharmaceutical companies’ efforts to‘ ‘communicate[e] with physicians in an 
effective and informative manner,’’ off-label promotions.105 Thus, under the current FDA 
regulatory regime, a detailer may not discuss off-label uses of a pharmaceutical drug or treatment 
with a physician. The Supreme Court’s reading of the first amendment, and the protections that it 
affords to commercial speech will likely render such restrictive regulation void for violation of 
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the first amendment. The Sorrell decisions’ broad protections prevent the FDA from directly 
(and now) indirectly regulating off-label promotion because such promotions can easily be 
construed as creation and dissemination of information which are speech for First Amendment 
purposes.
106
 Legislators and regulatory agents such as the FDA will need to augment their laws 
and regulations to comport with the Sorrell.  
The industry will likely benefit from the removal of marketing barriers by the Sorrell 
decision, but legal and regulatory agencies must alter their current structures or create new legal 
and regulatory regimes to comply with the Supreme Court’s reading of First Amendment 
protections. 
V. Information, Data-Mining and Ad-based Revenue as a Funding Mechanism in 
the Digital Age Health Care. 
Data-mining for marketing purposes is the engine that powers the information age. It is a 
ubiquitous in nearly every social network and Tech Company, the aggregation and sale of user 
information to generate revenue. This section will first provide some of the many societal, 
governmental and consumer benefits that are achieved through the implementation of data-
mining provided by health information companies. Next, this section will discuss how prescriber 
information used for marketing purposes is necessary to achieve these benefits. Ultimately, we as 
a society should welcome, utilize and craft data, rather than establishing laws and regulation that 
shore up privacy protections at the cost of future advances and benefits to society, government, 
consumers and industry. 
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A. Utility uses of Prescriber Information: The Societal and Consumer Benefits of Data-
Mining and Prescriber Information. 
Consumers receive a very real and direct benefit from the utilization of prescriptive data.  
The implementation of prescriber information can be used to locate and prescribe innovative and 
lifesaving pharmaceutical treatments to patients in need. An example of such lifesaving 
implementation is demonstrated in the release of Banzel. Banzel was approved by the FDA in 
2008 to treat Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome.
107
 Lennox-Gastaut Syndrome is a rare and severe form 
of epilepsy. Seizures usually begin before 4 years of age. Seizure types, which vary among 
patients, include tonic
108
, atonic
109
, atypical absence 
110
, and myoclonic
111
.
112
 There may be 
periods of frequent seizures mixed with brief, relatively seizure-free periods. Most children with 
Lennox-Gastaut syndrome experience some degree of impaired intellectual functioning or 
information processing, along with developmental delays, and behavioral disturbances.
113
 The 
rarity of the disease
114
 would normally present difficulties in tracking and deploying innovative 
treatment options. The task of locating and deploying treatment to such a limited number of 
individuals would be costly and inefficient through traditional means of inquiry and 
advertisement. Rather, Eisai, the developer of Banzel utilized presciber information to locate 
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physicians who had previously prescribed pre-Banzel  Lennox Gastaut syndrome treatments.
115
 
Eiasi was able to contact and provide information for Banzel  to the very small subset of 
physicans who were treating Lennox Gastaut syndrome.
116
 One of the few states where Eisai had 
difficulty locating patients who suffered from Lennox Gastaute syndrome was New Hampshire, 
where state legislation blocked Eisai’s ability to utilize prescriber information to provide 
treatment.
117
 
Banzel is just one example of the societal benefits of prescriber information. The 
information can be an extraordinary benefit to consumers who, without such data collection, 
might not receive proper care and treatment. Banzel is demonstrative of the neutrality of 
information and how, through proper implementation that information can be used for societal 
benefit. But more so, Banzel is also a case study in the dangers of over-regulation. New 
Hampshire’s anti-data laws made it very difficult to locate patients who suffered from Lennox 
Gastaut syndrome. The Supreme Court’s Sorrell did not completely eliminate the possibility that 
future state legislation would block the effective use of prescriber information for the benefit of 
consumers and citizens. As noted above, The Supreme Court did not eliminate limitations on 
prescriber information and detailing, rather the Court simply required broader limitations on 
parties who utilized prescriber information as well as narrower exceptions to a broad ban.
118
 
Therefore states that zealously protect physicians privacy interests may attempt to legislate under 
the endorsed structure, ergo create near-insurmountable barriers to public-benefit use of 
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prescriber information. The Banzel case is just one example of direct public benefit from 
prescriber information, The public and non-industry actors also benefit in other ways as well. 
Prescriptive information is also used to monitor the safety and effectiveness of  FDA 
approved pharmaceuticals.
119
 Usage Trend Mapping is vital to ensuring the safety and usability 
of prescription drugs.  Usage Trend Mapping is done through the implementation of Prescriber 
Information. 
120
After the information has been thoroughly analyzed it is used to develop best 
clinical practices. An example of this implementation of prescriber information for public benefit 
can be demonstrated in the decrease in invasive surgery after the introduction of proton pump 
inhibitors.
121
 Doctors implemented prescriber information to monitor these results and their 
research ultimately led to fewer invasive procedures, shorter recovery times, and overall reduced 
costs.
122
 
Data-mining of prescriptive information has also been implemented in FDA practices. 
RiskMAPs
123
 are plans that the FDA strongly suggest
124
 pharmaceutical companies develop to 
monitor and minimize the risk of pharmaceutical drugs.
125
 The stated goal of RiskMAPS are: 
risk management as an iterative process encompassing the assessment of risks and benefits, the 
minimization of risks, and the maximization of benefits.
126
 RiskMAP means a strategic safety 
program designed to meet specific goals and objectives in minimizing known risks of a product 
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while preserving its benefits.
127
 A RISKMAP targets one or more safety-related health outcomes 
or goals and uses one or more tools to achieve those goals.
128
 This process would be extremely 
difficult to implement without the use of prescriber information because RISKMAPs require the 
pharmaceutical industry be able to monitor usage and prescriptive trends of individual 
physicians.
129
 In the post-Sorrell paradigm, where restrictions on prescriber information must be 
broad, disallowing or the outright barring of prescriber information will make the development 
of RISKMAPs nearly impossible. Government agencies such as the FDA rely on prescriber 
information to make more effective and efficient policies, any limitations on use would prove 
detrimental to the health of individuals. 
The FDA is not the only government agency that relies on and is benefitted by the 
collection, aggregation and analysis of prescriber information. The DEA and other law 
enforcement organizations are aided in their fight against abuse through prescriber information. 
Prescriber information allows law enforcement organizations to receive prescriber information 
for pharmaceuticals that have a high risk of drug abuse. Prescription drug abuse is the fastest 
growing drug problem in the United States.
130
 With the aid of prescriber information law 
enforcement organizations are able to target unethical physicians and “pill mills” who overly 
prescriber medications prone to abuse.
131
 With a third of new drug users initially abusing 
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prescription drugs,
132
 prescription drug abuse and the sale of drugs by doctors will only become 
more of an issue. Prescriber information is necessary to the identification of physicians who over 
prescribe and endanger the lives of addicts. If state laws are drafted to limit the use of prescriber 
information, prescription drug abuse will likely be more widespread because the methods, tools 
and techniques that law enforcement agencies utilize will be limited. 
B. Direct Industrial Benefits from Commercial Use of Prescriber Data and Its Indirect 
Benefit to Consumers. 
Sub-section A makes clear that consumers, government and society are directly benefited 
from the collection, analysis and implementation of prescriber information, but there are also 
indirect benefits to consumers and society via industry uses. Although these benefits are largely 
limited to pharmaceutical companies, they produce externalities that are also beneficial to others. 
There are extraordinary societal benefits generated by the healthcare and pharmaceutical 
industries. Pharmaceutical developments have accounted for a 2% increase in average life 
expectancy.
133
 For cancer patients specifically, innovative medical and pharmaceutical 
treatments have increased life expectancy by approximately three years and eighty-six percent of 
these gains are attributable to innovative treatments.
134
 At the heart of these medical advances 
are pharmaceutical research and development. Pharmaceutical research companies are 
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responsible for nearly all advances in pharmaceutical treatment.
135
 Thus it is beneficial to society 
and the health of consumers to limit laws and regulation that would stymie or prohibit advances 
and profitability of the healthcare and pharmaceutical industry. Because detailing and marketing 
is such a vital part of securing revenue to continue research and acquire smaller research firms, 
laws and regulation should analyze societal costs to limiting the profitability and sales generation 
of the pharmaceutical industry. But data-mining and detailing is not only beneficial indirectly, as 
a means of increasing sales and revenue to continue to fund innovative research, but it can and is 
used to benefit consumers and government as well. 
Prescriber information can also be beneficial for physicians in practice. Often times, 
prescriber information and detailing are used to provide (albeit biased) information to physicians 
who might not ordinarily be up to date on information. In fact, a survey of doctors has concluded 
that doctors find that pharamctucial representatives are a great source of information.
136
 
Representatives often provide reprints of clinical studies published in peer-reviewed medical 
literature, as well as other scientific and safety-related information regarding the company’s 
medicines.
137
 With many new drugs entering the market it is difficult for a physician to stay up-
to-date on every advancement, detailers – through the use of prescriber information are able to 
provide doctors with knowledge and information on new treatments that may be beneficial to 
particular patients they are treating.
138  Sales representatives are the most time-saving source of 
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information because they visit primary care physicians, compile information on clinical studies 
for them and remind them of drug information.
139
 Doctors also rely on information from medical 
scholarship, other physicians, insurance companies, and state-funded actors to receive 
information.
140
 A wide array of information sources is only beneficial to both the patient and 
physician, and ultimately physicians are capable and responsible of using best medical judgment 
when recommending or prescribing a treatment.
141
 
Data-mining and detailing produce industrial benefits. Pharmaceutical companies require 
a return on investment and prescriber data is a means of generating more revenue for investment. 
Further, Data-mining and detailing are used as an indirect source of information to physicians. 
Data-mining and prescriber information are beneficial to the healthcare of our society. It can help 
agencies and drug developers track medications to decrease cost and increase safe and effective 
treatment, as well as assisting law enforcement in combating drug abuse. If government attempts 
to restrain the use and implementation of prescriber data, it will be at the detriment of not only 
industry but also consumers that rely on innovative treatment the most. 
C. The Necessary Market: Detailing as a Funding Mechanism for Prescriber 
Information Benefits. 
There are numerous benefits generated by the collection, aggregation and analysis of 
prescriber information.  Companies like IMS Health, Inc. and Verispan do more than provide 
marketing tools for pharmaceutical companies, as Section III A of this paper has demonstrated, 
prescriber information is utilized to the benefit of consumers and government agencies as well. 
While non-marketing users benefit from prescriber information, they alone do not establish the 
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demand necessary to sustain the industry absent pharmaceutical companies implementation of 
data for marketing purposes. This section will demonstrate that the benefits derived from data-
mining are sustained only through the infusion of money provided by marketing.  
Data analysis for marketing purposes is the engine of the information age.  Companies such 
as Google and Facebook collect and analyze user data and provide targeted advertising for 
purchasers of ad space.
142
 Every search query and link clicked on Google, and every product 
liked or discussed on Facebook, is spun into data and aggregated accordingly. This information 
is worth billions of dollars to companies looking to advertise with these two giants.
143
 In turn, 
Google and Facebook use this ad revenue to fund projects that would otherwise be unprofitable, 
such as a search engine, or a social media site, or any other number of products and services that 
these two tech giants develop. 
The funding mechanism for IMS Health, Inc. and other health information companies is 
similar, but rather than data-collection and analysis being intra-company, the health information 
industry is dispersed through many companies and industries. IMS Health, Inc. purchases data 
from pharmacy retailers, and then aggregates and analyzes the information for trends. After 
analysis, the information is then compiled into marketable products for clients.
144
 When there is a 
large demand, the price of the data-product will increase accordingly. As the price and sales 
increases, so too does revenue from the sale of these products. Currently, pharmaceutical 
companies are the largest consumers of prescriber information and accordingly support the entire 
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industry.
145
 While pharmaceutical companies purchase much of this data for marketing purposes, 
the information is also used to the benefit of consumers, physicians and government as well. The 
demand and value of these other uses are not marketable to the point of being cost efficient. It 
can therefore be concluded, that like Google and Facebook, who provide products funded by data 
analysis for marketing purposes, so too, does society receive benefits implicitly funded by the 
sale of information to pharmaceutical companies for marketing purposes. 
Without large pharmaceutical companies purchasing information for detailing and 
marketing, it is unlikely that companies like IMS Health, Inc. would be able to provide the 
necessary level of sophistication and completeness that are obtainable through the current model. 
While there is a privacy cost to these benefits, the societal benefits far outweigh the ancillary 
infringement upon doctor’s privacy claims.  
 
VI. Conclusion. 
Data-mining for marketing purposes is a necessary cost to providing optimal levels of 
healthcare and consumer safety. Consumers benefit from pharmaceutical tracking, and 
information development, through drug abuse prevention and from more knowledge physicians. 
The battle over prescriber information’s implementation is not over, but future laws should 
recognize the clear and substantial benefits that data-mining offers and allow for its 
implementation and funding through marketing. The answer is not always more regulation, but 
better regulation.  
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